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This paper examines the effects that windfalls from international commodity price booms 
have on net foreign assets in a panel of 145 countries during the period 1970-2007. The main 
finding is that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a significant 
increase in net foreign assets, but only in countries that are ethnically homogeneous. In highly 
ethnically polarized countries, net foreign assets significantly decreased. To explain this 
asymmetry, the paper shows that in ethnically polarized countries commodity windfalls lead 
to large increases in government consumption expenditures and political corruption. The 
paper's findings are consistent with theoretical models of the current account that have a built-
in voracity effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Basic  intertemporal  theory  of  the  current  account  predicts  that  countries  which  experience  
temporary  revenue  windfalls  from  international  commodity  price  booms  should  experience  an 
increase in their net foreign assets (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
1 Because a large share of these 
revenue windfalls often accrues to the government, this key prediction may not hold however in the 
data -- there is the common pool problem that counteracts the standard consumption smoothing 
effect. Lane and Tornell (1998a) show in a non -representative agent model that when there are 
multiple powerful groups that seek redistribution from the public budget a revenue windfall will 
lead to large increases in government spending, and thus, depending on the degree of polarization of 
the fiscal claimants, induce a current account deterioration.
2 An important implication of the model 
of Lane and Tornell is that the relationship between wealth shocks and the current account is 
nonlinear. In particular, it may be negative in highly polarized countries.  
  This paper uses panel data for 145 countries during the period 1970 -2007 to rigorously 
examine the relationship between wealth shocks from international commodity price booms and 
changes in countries' net foreign assets. A key advantage of the paper's panel data approach is that it 
allows to examine the relationship between commodity windfalls and changes in net foreign assets 
based on exclusively the within-country variation of the data. The within-country approach not only 
makes the results more readily comparable to macro models, which are naturally about a within -
country  time-series  relationship.  The  within -country  approach  also  allows  to  circumvent  a 
potentially important cross-sectional omitted variables bias. A further   important feature of the 
paper's empirical analysis is that, because the commodity export price index is constructed by 
interacting  the fixed  (i.e.  time -invariant) country-specific  export shares  with  the  international 
                                                 
1  Under  certain  preference  parameters  more  advanced  models  of  the  current  account  which  are  based  on  the 
intertemporal representative agent theory can generate a decrease in net foreign assets following positive transitory 
wealth shocks. We show in this paper that the mechanism set out by these models is however in contrast with what 
we  find  in  the  data  regarding  the  responses  of  GDP  per  capita,  investment,  and,  in  particular,  government 
consumption expenditures and political corruption.  
2  See also Lane and Tornell (1996, 1998b) and Tornell and Lane (1998) for further models on the voracity effect.  3 
commodity prices, the time-series variation in the export price index constitutes for most countries a 
plausibly exogenous source of wealth shocks. 
  The  paper's  first  main  finding  is  that  the  average  marginal  effect  of  commodity  price 
windfalls on net foreign assets is positive but statistically insignificant. This is true for the impact 
effect as well as for lagged effects, and holds regardless of whether a static or dynamic panel data 
model is estimated. Moreover, there is also no significant average effect on changes in net foreign 
assets when distinguishing between price changes of minerals and hydrocarbon resources, which 
tend to be more persistent, and price changes of agricultural commodities, which tend to be more 
transitory. The paper's first main finding therefore stands in contrast with traditional intertemporal 
models of the current account.  It is however consistent with the well-known Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980) puzzle that changes in savings do not feed one-to-one into the current account.  
  The  paper's  second  main  finding  is  that  the  marginal  effect  of  revenue  windfalls  from 
commodity  price  booms  on  net  foreign  assets  is  significantly  smaller  in  countries  that  are 
characterized  by  high  levels  of  ethnic  polarization.  This  cross-country  heterogeneity  in  the 
relationship is so strong that in countries with very high levels of ethnic polarization commodity 
windfalls lead to a decrease in net foreign assets. On the other hand, in countries with low levels of 
ethnic polarization commodity windfalls lead to a significant increase in net foreign assets. While 
the increase in net foreign assets in the ethnically homogenous countries can be well explained by 
standard  intertemporal  models  of  the  current  account,  the  acyclical  average  response,  and,  in 
particular, the negative response in the highly ethnically polarized countries cannot.  
  What makes it particularly difficult for standard models of the current account to explain the 
negative  effect  of  commodity  price  booms  on  the  net  foreign  asset  position  in  the  ethnically 
polarized countries is that in these countries investment significantly decreased. Clearly, standard 
intertemporal  models  can  generate  a  decrease  in  the  net  foreign  asset  position  following  a 4 
commodity price boom if the boom is of permanent nature.
3 But, in that case there should  be also  
no decrease in investment. The fact that in ethnically polarized countries investment significantly 
decreased following a commodity price boom is a first indication that the voracity model developed 
by Lane and Tornell is consistent with the paper's empirical results. 
  As a further intermediate channel on the voracity effect of commodity price windfalls in 
ethnically polarized countries, the paper documents that increases in the international prices of 
exported commodity goods lead to large and sta tistically significant increases in government 
consumption  expenditures.  These  increases  in  government  consumption  expenditures  were 
associated with significant increases in political corruption in the ethnically polarized countries. 
Also GDP per capita growth did not increase significantly following the commodity price windfall 
in these countries – despite the significant increase in government consumption expenditures. On 
the other hand, in the ethnically homogeneous countries, where the commodity price windfall led to 
a significant improvement of the current account, GDP per capita growth significantly increased 
following the commodity price boom.  
  In terms of measuring the power concentration of groups, an important feature of the paper's 
empirical analysis is the use of an ethnic polarization index. In contrast to a fractionalization index 
which is strictly increasing in the number of groups, the polarization index is largest when there are 
two groups which are of equal size. The polarization index therefore captures that power struggles 
are maximized when there are two equally powerful groups that lobby (or fight) for resources.
4 As 
the number of groups increase, the polarization index decreases. This is an important characteristic 
of the polarization index because a key result of the Lane and Tornell voracity model is that the 
                                                 
3  Depending  on  other  factors,  such  as  for  example  the  anticipation  of  the  revenue  windfall,  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between tradables and nontradables, or the degree of precautionary saving a transitory revenue windfall 
from a commodity price boom can also generate a decrease in net foreign assets in the standard intertemporal model. 
See for example Svensson and Razzin (1983), Persson and Svensson (1985), Backus et al. (1994), Mendoza (1995), 
or Carroll and Jeanne (2009). But, investment and output usually increases in these models following a positive 
terms of trade shock. Empirical papers that have examined the relationship between the terms of trade and the 
current account include among others Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), Loayza et al. (2000), Calderon et al. (2002), 
or Cashin and McDermott (2002). These papers focus on the average effect and do not investigate the role of ethnic 
polarization in determining the relationship. 
4  See for example Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) or Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b). 5 
voracity effect is largest when there are two powerful groups, and diminishes as the number of 
groups increase. 
  The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe and contrast the 
intertemporal  representative  agent  mechanism  of  the  current  account  with  the  political  economy 
voracity mechanism. In Section 3 we describe our data and in Section 4 we explain our estimation 
strategy. In Section 5 we present our main empirical results. And in Section 6 we conclude. 
 
2. Intertemporal Representative Agent vs. Voracity Political Economy Mechanism 
We begin this section by briefly reviewing the mechanism through which a commodity windfall 
affects  the  current  account  in  the  standard  intertemporal  representative  agent  model.  We  then 
contrast this mechanism to the political economy voracity mechanism that is contained in the model 
of Lane and Tornell (1998a).  
  To lay grounds, it is useful to recall from the basic income accounting identity that the 
current account is equal to the difference between domestic savings and private investment: 
In the basic intertemporal representative agent model (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, 
Section  3.1.1)  the  key  mechanism  through  which  a  transitory  wealth  shock  affects  the  current 
account  is  the  intertemporal  smoothing  of  consumption  of  the  representative  agent.  Without 
frictions in the financial markets, the intertemporal theory predicts perfect consumption smoothing 
over the life-cycle. Thus, in the presence of a temporary wealth shock current consumption of the 
representative agent  reacts  little and the representative agent  has  to  decide how to  allocate the 
additional savings between domestic capital and foreign assets. If there are diminishing returns to 
domestic capital, then domestic investment will not respond because the transitory wealth shock 
does  not  affect  the  productivity  of  domestic  capital.  The  additional  savings  will  therefore  be 
invested in foreign assets, leading to a current account increase. 
  An important extension of the basic intertemporal model in relation to our empirical study of 
I G C Y I S CA      6 
the  effects  that  wealth  shocks  from  international  commodity  price  booms  have  on  the  current 
account is the presence of nontradeable goods.
5 When the international prices of tradeable goods 
change the intertemporal consumption decision of the representative agent is affected much in the 
same way as changes in the interest rate affect the intertemporal decision to consume. However,  
while the size of the percentage change in the consumption response to changes in the interest rate 
depends exclusively on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the size  – and the sign – of the 
consumption response to changes in  the international  prices of tradeables depends  on both  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  and  the  intratemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
tradeables  and  non-tradeables.
6  Intuitively,  this  is  because  when  the  international  prices  of 
tradeables are temporarily high the representative household faces a tradeoff between foregoing 
current consumption and reaping the benefits of the temporarily higher prices in the international 
commodity market; or increasing current consumption and reaping the benefits of the  temporarily 
cheaper  (relative)  domestic  prices  of  nontradeables.  Hence,  in  the  presence  of  a  temporary 
commodity windfall that increases income and the relative price of tradeables current consumption, 
and thus the current account, can either increase or d ecrease – depending on the constellation of 
preference parameters. 
  The  underlying  mechanism  of  the  voracity  model  that  explains  potential  cross-country 
differences  in  the  response  of  the  current  account  is  very  different.  Rather  than  predicting  a 
heterogeneous response of the current account to transitory wealth shocks as a function of cross-
country differences in preference parameters, the non-representative agent voracity model predicts 
that  the  response  of  the  current  account  to  a  transitory  wealth  shock  crucially  depends  on  the 
                                                 
5  See for example Section 3.1.4 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995); and also the empirical studies of Bergin and Sheffrin  
(2000) and Iscan (2000). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for motivating us to discuss this extension. 
6  Formally, under a CES utility function the Euler equation is ΔlnCt+1=σln(1+rt+1)+(σ-ρ)(ΔlnPt+1
T-ΔlnPt+1
NT), where 
ΔlnCt+1  is the change of the log of consumption between between period t and t+1; rt+1  is the interest rate; ΔlnPt+1
T  is 
the change of the log of the price of tradeables between period t and t+1; ΔlnPt+1
NT is the change of the log of the 
price  of  nontradeables  between  period  t  and  t+1;  σ  is  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution;  and  ρ  is  the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradeables and non-tradeables. See for example Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) Section 3.1.4.  
 7 
structure of fiscal claimants. The main idea is that when there are several powerful groups that seek 
to appropriate revenues from the government budget (which represents a common pool problem) a 
voracity effect can occur where a temporary wealth shock that increases government tax revenues 
leads to a disproportional increase in government spending. Lane and Tornell (1998a) show that this 
voracity effect is strongest when there are two powerful groups. In this case, a temporary wealth 
shock  leads  to  a  very  large  increase  in  government  expenditures  that  drives  down  the  current 
account, while at the same time leading to a decrease in investment. 
  In  sum,  there  are  two  main  differences  between  the  approach  of  the  political  economy 
voracity model and the representative agent intertemporal model. First, the focus on the fiscal sector 
as a main driving force for changes in the current account. Second, and perhaps more importantly 
for  explaining  cross-country  differences  in  the  response  of  the  current  account  to  commodity 
windfalls, the focus on the polarization of groups that seek to obtain revenues from the government 
budget. This second focus on differences in polarization provides the basis for testing empirically in 
a world-wide sample of countries how the current account  responds to revenue windfalls from 
international commodity price booms as a function of cross-country differences in polarization.  
  As  discussed  in  the  second  paragraph  of  this  section,  the  intertemporal  model  can  also 
generate cross-country differences in the response of the current account as a function of differences 
in  preference  parameters.  These  differences  in  preference  parameters  are  certainly  difficult  to 
estimate consistently with real data in a world-wide sample of countries. One would have to argue 
therefore on a theoretical basis, that cross-country differences in polarization go hand-in-hand with 
cross-country differences in preference parameters regarding the intertemporal and intra-temporal 
elasticity of substitution. We believe that this debate goes beyond the realm of this paper. However, 
it is useful to note that in the voracity model there is a clear prediction that the difference in the 
current account response should be due to a difference in government expenditures, and this is 
something that we can test with data. Also, the voracity model predicts that these government 8 
expenditures are socially sub-optimal, an element that is not contained in the standard intertemporal 
approach of the current account. Hence, it will be natural to examine whether there is an adverse 
response of GDP per capita growth, private investment, and corruption in the polarized countries. If 
this is indeed the case, then the alternative possibility that these differences in the current account 
are driven by differences in preference parameters related to the inter- and intra-temporal elasticity 
of substitution becomes unlikely. We now explain in detail our data and estimation strategy and 
then follow with a discussion of our main empirical results.  
 
3. Data  
 
Commodity Windfalls. To capture revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms, 
we construct a country-specific international commodity export price index:  
where ComPricec,t is the international price of commodity c in year t, and θi,c is the average (time-
invariant)  value  of  exports  of  commodity  c  in  the  GDP  of  country  i.  The  data  on  annual 
international commodity prices are for the 1970-2007 period from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics. 
Data on the value of commodity exports are from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. The 
commodities included in  the commodity export price index are aluminum,  beef, coffee, cocoa, 
copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case 
there were multiple prices listed for the same commodity a simple average of all the relevant prices 
is used. 
Polarization. Data on ethnic polarization are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b). The 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol polarization index is constructed as:  
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index  measures  the  normalized  distance  of  a  particular  distribution  of  groups  from  a  bimodal 
distribution. The index is maximized when there are two groups which are of equal size. The index  
emphasizes therefore that conflict tensions are greatest when there are two equally powerful groups.  
  Note that the polarization index differs from the well-known fractionalization index. The 
fractionalization index is defined as: 
 
 
A key property of the fractionalization index is that, in contrast to the polarization index, it is 
strictly increasing in the number of groups. Intuitively, the fractionalization index measures the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will not belong to the same  group. 
For  further  discussion  on  fractionalization  vs.  polarization  with  an  application  to  conflict,  see 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b). 
  We furthermore note that for purposes of examining empirically whether there is a voracity 
effect,  the  polarization  index  is  much  better  suited  than  the  index  of  fractionalization.  This  is 
because the  voracity model of Lane and Tornell predicts that the voracity effect is strongest when 
there are two equally powerful groups; that there is no voracity effect when the number of groups is 
equal to one; and that the voracity effect decreases as the number of groups increases beyond two. 
This is precisely what the polarization index captures. The fractionalization index, on the other 
hand, is linearly increasing in the number of groups. Therefore, it does not capture the non-linearity 
predicted by the Lane and Tornell model. In the empirical exercise we therefore concentrate on the 
polarization index and show as a robustness check results that use the index of fractionalization. 
Net Foreign Assets and Other Data. Our annual data on net foreign assets are from Lane and 
Milessi-Ferretti (2007). These data are standard and do not require further description here as a 
detailed description can be found in the paper of Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2007). Real GDP per 
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Table, version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). The data on the net barter terms of trade are from WDI 
(2010). The data on political corruption and the risk of expropriation are from Political Risk Service 
(2010)  and  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2009).  Tables  1  and  2  report  some  summary  statistics  of  these 
variables. 
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
To examine the effects that commodity price windfalls have on net foreign assets and other key 
variables of interest we estimate the following econometric model: 
where αi are country fixed effects that capture time-invariant country-specific unobservables and βt 
are year fixed effects that capture common year shocks. ui,t is an error term that is clustered at the 
country level. NFAit is the share of net foreign assets in GDP and ΔComPIit is the change of the log 
of the international commodity export price index.  
  As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal effect that commodity windfalls 
have on net foreign assets in a world sample. We then examine how cross-country differences in  
ethnic polarization affect the relationship between commodity windfalls and net foreign assets by 
splitting the sample into different groups based on countries' ethnic polarization. As a robustness 
check on whether the heterogeneity is  driven by  other factors we also present  estimates  of  an 
interaction model where the international commodity export price index is interacted with other 
variables  that  could  possibly  induce  cross-country  differences  in  the  relationship  between 
commodity windfalls and net foreign assets. 
 
5. Main Results 
Table 3 presents our estimates of the average marginal effect that commodity price windfalls have 
on net foreign assets. Column (1) shows pooled least-squares estimates that are based on cross-
t i t i t i t i u ComPI NFA , , , ) (         11 
sectional as well as within-country data variation. In column (2) country fixed effects are included 
to capture cross-country unobservable differences that are driving both the size of the commodity 
windfall and the change in the country's net foreign assets. Column (3) adds year fixed effects to 
control for global shocks such as for example the world business cycle or political events such as 
the end of the Cold War that could affect both the overall yearly change in net foreign assets and the 
change in international  commodity prices.
7 The main result is that windfalls from international 
commodity price booms have a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the net foreign asset 
position. And, there continues to be a positive but insignificant effect when  adding further lags and 
leads of the commodity price index (columns (4) and (5)), or when controlling for lagged changes 
in net foreign assets (columns (6) and (7)).  
  A possible reason for the insignificant response of the net foreign asset position is th at the 
time-series dynamics of many of the international commodity prices are quite persistent (see the 
Data Appendix Table 2). Table 4, columns (1) and (2) show however that there continues to be an 
insignificant  effect  of  commodity  price  windfalls  on  the   net  foreign  asset  position  when 
distinguishing  between  mineral  and  hydrocarbon  commodity  prices  (which  tend  to  be  very 
persistent) and agricultural commodity prices (which tend to be more transitory). 
  Our identifying assumption is that variations in the  international commodity prices are a 
plausibly exogenous source of variation in revenue windfalls. This assumption is reasonable for the 
majority  of  countries  in  our  sample  as  these  countries  are  price  takers  on  the  international 
commodity market. Hence, v ariations in the international commodity prices are exogenous to 
within-country changes in politico-economic conditions, and hence to changes in net foreign assets. 
There might however be a few countries where the price -taker assumption is less applicable. To 
demonstrate that our results are not driven by these observations, we report in column (3) of Table 4 
results where we exclude large commodity exporting countries. As column (3) shows, there is no 
                                                 
7  Both the country and year fixed effects are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.000.  12 
significant average effect of commodity price windfalls on countries' net foreign assets positions 
when we exclude potentially large commodity exporting countries.
8 
  The results change substantially when grouping countries according to their levels of ethnic 
polarization. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that there is a highly significant positive average effect 
of revenue windfalls on the net foreign asset position in countries that are in the bottom 25th 
percentile of the cross-country ethnic polarization distribution. Column (2) shows that the effect of 
commodity windfalls on the net foreign asset position is also positive in the group of countries that 
are in the bottom 50th percentile. But the coefficient is quantitatively smaller and statistically only 
significant at the 10% level. Moving to the top 50th percentile (column (3)) the effect of commodity 
windfalls on the net foreign asset position is statistically insignificant and quantitatively only about 
60% of the size of the estimated average marginal effect of the bottom 25th percentile. Moving to 
the top 25th percentile (column (4)) the average marginal effect is also statistically insignificant and 
only about one-tenth of the estimated average marginal effect of the bottom 25th percentile.
9 
  What explains this asymmetry in the relationship? Table 6 shows tha t commodity price 
revenue windfalls had a significant positive effect on the terms of trade in the group of countries 
with high and low degrees of ethnic polarization. Therefore, it is not the case that changes in the 
international commodity prices had no  significant effect on the terms of trade in the ethnically 
polarized countries. In fact, Panel A of Appendix Table 2 shows that through their effects on the 
                                                 
8  The rule for excluding countries is that they produce for a given commodity good more than 3% of the world 
commodity supply. The excluded countries are Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela. 
9  We note that the time-series properties of the majority of the commodity prices in our commodity price index 
indicates, that what our regressions are capturing is the response of the current account to transitory revenue 
windfalls. We also made an attempt to isolate those shocks that were on average very persistent, by focusing on the 
three most persistent commodity prices (iron, oil, and copper) where the AR(1) coefficient on these prices is almost 
unity (1.03, 0.97, and 0.95 respectively). Hence, variations in these prices represent a shock that is very persistent. 
Appendix Table 1 shows that if we use these very persistent commodity price shocks, then results are similar: the 
current account improves due to a positive commodity price windfall in the countries where polarization is low 
while in the countries where polarization is high the current account response is negative, albeit statistically 
insignificant. Thus, even if we use only these commodity prices that are very persistent the main finding that the 
response of the current account to windfalls varies significantly as a function of cross-country differences in 
polarization continues to hold. 13 
terms of trade commodity windfalls had a significant positive effect on the net foreign asset position 
in the group of countries with low ethnic polarization and an insignificant effect in the group of 
countries with high polarization. Panel B of Appendix Table 2 also shows that similar results are 
obtained when directly regressing the change in net foreign assets on the change in the terms of 
trade.
10  
  Table  7  provides  a  first  explanation  for  the  difference  in  the  relationship  between 
commodity windfalls and net foreign assets. The table shows that while in the ethnically polarized 
countries investment  significantly decreased following the commodity windfall, in the group of 
countries with very low ethnic polarization investment significantly increased.
11 Standard models of 
the current account readily predict the significant increase in investment followi ng the commodity 
boom (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). But, they do not readily predict the significant decrease in 
the ethnically polarized countries. On the other hand, the voracity model of Lane and Tornell does 
predict a significant decrease in investment in ethnically polarized countries. 
  To  explore  further  the  voracity  channel,  Table  8  reports  estimates  of  the  effect  that 
commodity  price  windfalls  have  on  GDP  growth,  government  consumption  expenditures, 
corruption, and the risk of expropriation for the above and below median sample ethnic polarization 
group. Column (1) of Panel A shows that, consistent with the investment response documented in 
Table 7, there is a negative albeit insignificant effect of commodity price windfalls on GDP per 
                                                 
10 Using directly the net barter terms of trade in the least squares estimation may be problematic because within-
country changes in the net barter terms of trade are driven also by within-country changes in the quantities of the 
commodities produced as well as changes in the commodity exporting country's trade policies (e.g. changes in 
import and export taxes, quotas, etc.). Therefore, within-country changes in the net barter terms-of-trade are much 
less exogenous to changes in countries' politico-economic conditions, and thus to changes in the current account, 
than changes in our international commodity export price index. We also note that in the model of Lane and Tornell 
(1998a), what is crucial for the voracity effect to occur is that the wealth shock affects tax revenues that accrue to 
the government budget. In principal, a change in the quantity of exports can induce a change in government tax 
revenues just like a change in the international price of the exported commodity good does in the case of an ad-
valorem tax on commodity exports. However, this abstracts from the possibility that a significant part of production 
could occur in the shadow economy. If the increase of the quantity of the exported commodity good occurs in the 
shadow  economy,  then  the  additional  production  of  the  exported  commodity  good  will  be  out  of  reach  from 
government taxes. In this case, government tax revenues are unlikely to be affected much by the increase in the 
production of the commodity good. Hence, one additional advantage of using variations in an international export 
price index is that these variations in the international commodity prices should feed more directly into changes of 
tax revenues in the commodity exporting countries.  
11 The investment series includes both public and private investment. 14 
capita growth in the high ethnic polarization sample. Panel B shows on the other hand that in the 
low ethnic polarization sample commodity price windfalls had a significant positive effect on GDP 
per  capita  growth.  Also  consistent  with  the  voracity  model,  column  (2)  shows  that  there  is  a 
significant  increase  in  government  consumption  expenditures  in  the  above  median  ethnic 
polarization group while in the below median ethnic polarization group the response of government 
consumption expenditures to commodity windfalls is insignificant. Furthermore, columns (3) and 
(4) of Panel A show that in the above median ethnic polarization group corruption and the risk of 
expropriation  significantly  increased,  while  Panel  B  shows  that  in  the  below  median  ethnic 
polarization sample corruption and the risk of expropriation did not increase significantly. 
  An important robustness check that goes beyond these intermediate channels is whether the 
heterogeneity in the effect that commodity price windfalls have on net foreign assets survives when 
controlling for other alternative factors that can drive the cross-country parameter heterogeneity. 
One obvious control variable that can possibly drive cross-country parameter heterogeneity is ethnic 
fractionalization. As discussed in Section 2, the ethnic fractionalization index is strictly increasing 
in the number of ethnic groups while the ethnic polarization index is maximized when there are two 
groups which are of equal size.  
  Column (1) of Table 9 shows that the marginal effect of commodity price windfalls on net 
foreign  assets  significantly  decreases  in  ethnic  polarization  when  controlling  for  a  possible 
interaction  effect  between  commodity  windfalls  and  ethnic  fractionalization.  The  interaction 
estimate in column (1) implies that in the most ethnically polarized countries a commodity windfall 
had a significant negative effect on the net foreign asset position. Consistent also with the Lane and 
Tornell  voracity  model,  column  (1)  shows  that  the  ethnic  fractionalization  interaction  term  is 
significantly positive. This means that commodity windfalls had a stronger positive effect on the net 
foreign asset position in countries where there are many different ethnic groups.  
  Column (2) of Table 9 shows that the nonlinearity in the relationship between commodity 15 
windfalls and net foreign assets is not due to the polarization and fractionalization index possibly 
picking up a diminishing or increasing returns to scale effect of commodity windfalls on net foreign 
assets.  In  addition,  column  (3)  documents  that  there  continues  to  be  a  significant  negative 
interaction  effect  between  commodity  price  windfalls  and  polarization  when  controlling  for 
differences in the relationship that are due to countries being debtor or credit countries.
12  
  In order to allow for a possible difference in the relationship between commodity windfalls 
and net foreign assets in rich and poor countries, column (4) of Table 9 adds to the regression an 
additional interaction term between commodity price windfalls and cross -country differences in 
average per capita GDP. The main result is that the ethnic polarization interaction continues to be 
negative and statistically significant at the conventional confidence level.  
  Only when controlling in column (5) for an interaction effect between commodity windfalls 
and cross-country differences in political corruption does the interaction effect between commodity 
windfalls and ethnic polarization turn insignificant. Political corruption entails excessive fiscal 
resource appropriation by powerful groups and so this is precisely the channel through which net 
foreign assets decrease in the voracity model. Hence, the result in column (5) that beyond its effect 
on political corruption the role of ethnic polarization is insignificant in shaping the net foreign asset 
response to commodity windfalls is consistent with the mechanism of fiscal resource appropriation 
laid out in the voracity model of Lane and Tornell. 
  As a robustness check on our main and preferred measure of polarization, Panel A of Tab le 
10 presents results when using instead of the ethnic polarization measure a measure of countries' 
religious polarization.
13 The main finding is that more religious  polarization significantly reduces 
the effect that wealth shocks from commodity windfalls  have on countries' net foreign asset 
position. Column (1) of Table 10 shows that there is a highly significant positive average effect of 
                                                 
12 Kraay and Ventura (2000) derive a theoretical model that shows that the relationship between terms of trade shocks 
and net foreign assets should be different in debtor and creditor countries.  
13 Data on religious polarization are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b). The unconditional sample correlation 
between religious and ethnic polarization is 0.29. 16 
commodity windfalls on the net foreign asset position in countries that are in the bottom 25th 
percentile of the cross-country religious polarization distribution. Column (2) shows that the effect 
of commodity windfalls on the net foreign asset position is also positive in the group of countries 
that are in the bottom 50th percentile. But the coefficient is quantitatively smaller and statistically 
only significant at the 5% significance level. Moving to the top 50th percentile (column (3)) and 
25th percentile (column (4)) shows that the effect of commodity windfalls on the net foreign asset 
position is statistically insignificant and quantitatively much smaller in absolute size. Panel B shows 
that similar results are obtained when using as a measure of polarization the interaction between 
ethnic and religious polarization. In sum, these results echo our main finding that the effects of 
wealth shocks from commodity windfalls on net foreign assets are significantly smaller in countries 
where groups are highly polarized.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper showed that the positive effect of windfalls from international commodity price booms 
on countries' net foreign asset positions is significantly decreasing in cross-country differences in  
polarization. Standard intertemporal models of the current account have difficulties in explaining 
this result, in particular, because in the highly polarized countries the commodity windfall led to a 
significant  decrease  in  investment.  On  the  other  hand,  the  non-representative  agent  model 
developed in Lane and Tornell (1998a) that generates a voracity effect is consistent with the paper's 
finding of a negative response in both the current account and investment in the highly polarized 
countries. The paper showed that consistent with the voracity model the commodity windfall led to 
a large increase in government consumption expenditures and corruption in polarized countries, 
while  in  the  ethnically  homogeneous  countries  government  consumption  expenditures  and 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
     
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs. 
ΔComPI  0.003  0.021  -0.092  0.439  4616 
ΔNFA  -0.004  0.565  -19.931  21.967  4616 
ΔGDP  0.035  0.074  -1.107  0.985  4616 
ΔGov  0.017  0.131  -2.135  1.719  4616 
ΔTOT  0.089  0.189  -2.010  1.463  3494 
ΔCorr  -0.031  0.452  -3  3  2042 
ΔExprop    0.075  1.195  -8  10  2042 
Ethpol  0.502  0.246  0.017  0.982  3828 





































Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
  ΔComPI  ΔNFA  ΔTOT  ΔGDP  ΔGov  ΔCorr   ΔExprop  Ethpol  Ethfrac 
ΔComPI  1                 
ΔNFA  0.040  1               
ΔTOT  0.327  0.090  1             
ΔGDP  0.027  0.055  0.371  1           
ΔGov  0.073  -0.025  0.057  0.237  1         
ΔCorr   0.018  0.014  0.072  0.023  0.026  1       
ΔExprop  0.022  0.023  0.097  0.083  -0.059  0.037  1     
Ethpol  0.045  0.001  -0.049  0.011  0.011  -0.011  0.042  1   









































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS  LS  LS  SYS-GMM 


















   




   
F.ΔComPI          -0.371 
(-1.52) 
   




Country FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4614  4614  4614  4518  4373  4469  4469 
Countries  145  145  145  145  145  145  145 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. The method of estimation in columns (1)-(6) is least squares; 
column (7) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-values shown in parentheses below the point estimates are based on Huber robust 





































Excluding Large  
Commodity Exporters 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  LS  LS  LS 






Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4614  4614  3214 
Countries  145  145  106 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in 
parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The commodities used in 
column (1) for the international commodity export price index are aluminium, copper, gold, iron, and oil. The commodities used in column (2) for the 
international commodity export price index are beef, coffee, cocoa, cotton, maize, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. Column (3) uses 
all commodities but excludes Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Indonesia, India, Iraq, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, 



































  Ethpol <0.25  Ethpol <0.56  Ethpol >0.56  Ethpol >0.70 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  737  1916  1912  729 
Countries  21  54  53  20 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. Δ ComPI is the change of the log of the international export price 
index. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors 








































  Ethpol <0.25  Ethpol <0.56  Ethpol >0.56  Ethpol >0.70 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  644  1787  1707  722 
Countries  18  51  53  21 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change in the terms of trade. Δ ComPI is the change of the log of the international export price index. The 
method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are 





















































Table 7. Commodity Windfalls, Polarization, and Investment 
 
  Ethpol <0.25  Ethpol <0.56  Ethpol >0.56  Ethpol >0.70 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 








Country Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  778  2070  1912  729 
Countries  21  55  58  23 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of investment per capita. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the 
point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 























































Table 8. Commodity Windfalls, Growth, Government Spending, and Corruption 
(Further Intermediate Channels) 
 
         ΔGDP             ΔGov. Expenditure           ΔCorruption     ΔExpropriation             
 
  Panel A: High Ethnic Polarization 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1911  1911  1009  1009 
Countries  53  53  46  46 
  Panel B: Low Ethnic Polarization 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1916  1916  1033  1033 
Countries  54  54  48  48 
 
Note: The dependent variable in column (1) is the change of the log of real per capita GDP; column (2) the change of the log of real per capita 
government expenditures; column (3) the change of the political corruption score (re-scaled so that higher values denote more corruption); column (4) 
the change of the risk of expropriation score (re-scaled so that higher values denote a higher risk of expropriation). The method of estimation is least 
squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
Panel A reports regressions for the sample of countries with above median ethnic polarization (ethpol>0.56). Panel B reports  regressions for the 
sample of countries with below median ethnic polarization (ethpol<0.56).  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS  LS 



















































ΔComPI*Corruption          -1.497*** 
(-3.64) 
Country Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3828  3828  3828  3828  3828 
Countries  107  107  107  107  107 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. Δ ComPI is the change of the log of the international export price 
index. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors 

























Table 10. Commodity Windfalls, Polarization, and Net Foreign Assets 




   
Panel A: Measure is Religious Polarization 
 
  Relpol <0.13  Relpol <0.54  Relpol >0.54  Relpol >0.83 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1014  1933  1895  987 
Countries  28  53  54  29 
   
 
Panel B: Measure is Interaction Between Ethnic and Religious Polarization 
 
  Ethpol*Relpol <0.03  Ethpol*Relpol<0.22  Ethpol*Relpol >0.22  Ethpol*Relpol >0.51 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 








Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1014  1933  1895  987 
Countries  28  53  54  29 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. Δ ComPI is the change of the log of the international export price 
index. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors 
























  Ethpol <0.25  Ethpol <0.56  Ethpol >0.56  Ethpol >0.70 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  LS  LS  LS  LS 
ΔComPI [Iron, Oil, 









Country Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  720  1751  1660  729 
Countries  21  54  53  20 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. Δ ComPI [Iron, Oil, and Copper only] refers to the change of the log 
of the international export price index that contains only prices of iron, oil and copper. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in 
parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from 














































  Ethpol <0.25  Ethpol <0.56  Ethpol >0.56  Ethpol >0.70 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   
Panel A: Two-Stage Least-Squares 
(IV is ΔComPI) 
 








First-Stage F-stat  124  44  65  32 
Country Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  639  1715  1610  651 
Countries  18  50  47  19 
   
Panel B: Least Squares 
         








Country Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  639  1715  1610  651 
Countries  18  50  47  19 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. The method of estimation in Panel A is two-stage least squares; 
Panel B least-squares. The instrumental variable in Panel A is the log-change of the international export price index. *Significantly different from 






















Data Appendix Table 1. List of Countries  33 
 
 
Data Appendix Table 1. List of Countries (continued)  
Country  ComExp/GDP Ethpol  NFA/GDP
Algeria 5.23 51.39 -24.55
Angola 9.51 57.21 -154.2
Argentina 0.75 57.88 -19.84
Australia 2.48 49.18 -38.97
Austria 0.71 23.98 -12.24
Bahrain 15.29 56.93 77.52
Bangladesh 0.03 13.18 -33.72
Benin 1.22 43.64 -45.38
Bolivia 0.63 76.66 -77.38
Brazil 0.71 77.32 -32.96
Cameroon 4.01 57.56 -42
Canada 2.52 67.24 -31.08
Central African Republic 1.6 57.78 -50.49
Chad 0.82 66.47 -56.61
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.51 58.59 -101.23
Congo, Republic of 8.66 67.37 -165.38
Costa Rica 1.63 42.04 -49.21
Cyprus 0.45 65.22 -10.01
Cote d`Ivoire 5.97 43.19 -95.16
Denmark 1.01 9.67 -26.95
Dominican Republic 1.64 72.54 -38.54
Ecuador 2.59 83.72 -72.06
Egypt 1.71 42.7 -38.88
El Salvador 1.88 27.91 -31.65
Ethiopia 0.54 77.79 -38.46
Fiji 4.31 92.98 -36.7
Finland 1.68 29.41 -35.03
France 0.63 29.44 1.78
Gabon 14.94 51.88 -55.15
Gambia, The 0.59 68.93 -76.76
Germany 0.62 22.74 9.48
Ghana 4.47 66.1 -48.57
Greece 0.72 18.61 -26.7
Guatemala 1.54 95.47 -10.07
Guinea 1.63 84.29 -78.13
Guinea-Bissau 3.1 53.19 -327.69
Guyana 13.4 81.33 -283.87
Haiti 0.55 20.7 -44.82
Honduras 1.96 42.96 -50.62
Hong Kong 0.14 6.6 132.28
Hungary 0.54 30.8 -61.6
Iceland 2.11 5.52 -49.15
India 0.16 34.82 -17.4
Indonesia 2.12 52.88 -44.41
Iran 4.07 59.84 10.26
Ireland 1.42 14.06 -31.9
Israel 0.29 54.77 -28.41
Italy 0.34 15.4 -6.8
Jamaica 2.69 60.02 -91.44
Japan 0.07 6.72 14.92
Jordan 0.08 98.24 -52.95
Kenya 1.37 38.13 -32.14
Korea, Republic of 0.33 2.78 -20.16
Kuwait 18.85 97.98 246.5134 
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Note: The table lists countries' average commodity export to GDP ratio, their 
average net foreign asset to GDP ratio, and their ethnic polarization index. All 
numbers have been multiplied by 100. 
Country  ComExp/GDP Ethpol  NFA/GDP
Liberia 18.56 39.04 -782.1
Madagascar 1.29 1.67 -62.9
Malawi 2.77 73.59 -82.91
Malaysia 5.55 76.16 -30.81
Mali 1.12 41.99 -70.9
Malta 0.83 16.71 28.28
Mauritania 5.88 53.61 -146.83
Mauritius 2.9 80.31 -10.06
Mexico 0.95 65.36 -35.63
Morocco 0.11 89.74 -42.19
Mozambique 0.79 49.86 -119.29
Nepal 0.08 65.18 -11.41
Netherlands 3.04 21.37 5.32
New Zealand 1.88 36.58 -62.28
Nicaragua 2.72 68.09 -243.17
Niger 0.4 69.77 -54.25
Nigeria 7.52 40.36 -63.85
Norway 5.98 9.02 -3.66
Oman 13.87 40.78 7.44
Pakistan 0.29 69.76 -38.05
Panama 1.09 58.62 -106.04
Papua New Guinea 10.81 66.87 -77.14
Paraguay 1.33 30.96 -12.85
Peru 1.26 81.7 -50.66
Philippines 0.68 49.65 -49.26
Poland 0.3 9.92 -40.58
Portugal 0.32 1.99 -35.58
Rwanda 0.96 40.13 -22.9
Samoa 0.71 38.78 -37.29
Saudi Arabia 13.53 11.39 75.96
Senegal 0.27 55.96 -57.45
Seychelles 2.68 60.02 -65.56
Sierra Leone 0.64 66.63 -90.85
South Africa 0.66 71.78 -24.36
Spain 0.27 69.33 -19.48
Sri Lanka 1.25 74.93 -39.76
Sudan 1.06 69.94 -152.6
Sweden 1.81 33.68 -18.63
Tanzania 1.73 27.1 -71.14
Thailand 1.16 58.23 -32.1
Togo 2.01 67.33 -82.43
Trinidad &Tobago 9.04 84.17 -61.11
Tunisia 1.08 16.73 -89.46
Turkey 0.42 34.24 -23.2
Uganda 2.35 27.86 -34.67
United Arab Emirates 17.41 64 197.02
United Kingdom 1.01 57.06 -0.21
United States 0.34 69.13 -4.06
Uruguay 1.35 42.64 -22.17
Venezuela 5.41 75.79 -3.29
Yemen 11.85 6.35 -15.58
Zambia 7.77 60.63 -157.55
Zimbabwe 1.21 69.78 -41.61
Average 3.17 49.96 -50.3836 
 
Data Appendix Table 2. List of Commodities 
 
Commodity  AR(1) Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Commodity  AR(1) Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Commodity  AR(1) Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Aluminium  0.62 
(0.12) 
Cotton  0.48 
(0.15) 
Rubber  0.84 
(0.13) 
Banana  0.53 
(0.17) 
Gold  0.89 
(0.15) 
Sugar  0.40 
(0.09) 
Beef  0.76 
(0.07) 
Iron  1.03 
(0.08) 
Tea  0.77 
(0.07) 
Cocoa  0.78 
(0.07) 
Maize  0.59 
(0.30) 
Tobacco  0.51 
(0.19) 






Wheat  0.67 
(0.10) 
Coffee  0.69 
(0.12) 
Rice  0.56 
(0.17) 
Wood  0.66 
(0.06) 
 